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Beyond binaries: sociological discourse on religion  in South Asia
The interface of religious identities, with state and politics is creating communal, ethnic and sectarian conflicts in South Asia. In 
spite of its geographical vastness and thousands of communities, the region remains conceived by sociologists in terms of religious 
identities. By continuing to discuss religious experiences, identities and conflicts in majority-minority terms, sociological discourse 
has become a tool of power and domination.  
Sujata Pate l
Sociological discourse on South Asia has not grasped the complexities of 
religion as it faces modernity. Seminal 
assumptions of colonial modernity and 
knowledge created a matrix of binaries 
– West and East, modernity and tradi-
tion, materiality and religiosity – that 
represented the project of modernity 
and were a colonial means of domina-
tion. Anthropologists and sociologists 
accept these binaries, constructing the-
ories of imminent and continuous reli-
gious traditions without realising that 
what they consider traditional is actu-
ally a modern process. Binary language 
prevents them from penetrating the 
opaqueness that binaries themselves 
construct (Patel 2006).
In India, the binary of majority and 
minority is not merely a discourse: cre-
ating group classifications highlights 
differences and structures power. Soci-
ologists play into this: cultural differ-
ences are dissolved into a master nar-
rative of majority and minority in order 
to empirically study groups. Such lan-
guage associates the same groups with 
the politics of constructing a major-
ity based on upper caste perceptions of 
religious practices. Since the late 19th 
century, attempts have been made to 
organise India’s Hindu majority as a 
nation under upper caste, or savarna, 
hegemony. Today, in a context of global 
change, this project continues to define 
Indian society and politics.
Sociologist T.N. Madan has written the 
most on this topic, using descriptive 
and indological methods to understand 
India’s religions, pluralism, diversity 
and secularism in terms of equality-hier-
archy binaries. He questions the process 
of modernity, but his language does not 
reflect the distinction between its domi-
nant forms, such as colonial modernity 
and non-western modernities. Thus, 
Madan uncritically integrates the bina-
ries of West and East, materiality and 
religiosity. Such a position cannot differ-
entiate cultural practices among jatis and 
ethnic groups, and fails to assess how 
these differences are subsumed under 
an upper caste perspective on Hindu-
ism. His latest book, India’s Religions. 
Perspectives from Sociology and History 
(2004), cites census statistics to suggest 
that Hindus form the largest religious 
community, followed by Muslims, Chris-
tians, Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains. Two 
issues must be considered here: using 
numbers to determine the strength of 
religious communities, and using the 
census to identify religious groups.
The trouble with numbers
The census depends on individuals to 
identify their religious affiliation. G.S. 
Ghurye and M.N. Srinivas have com-
mented on how the census in colonial 
and independent India was used to 
mobilise groups by defining identities. 
B.S. Cohn (1987) has suggested that the 
census was a tool not only for construct-
ing self-identity but that self-identifica-
tion occurred in response to the colo-
nial government’s objectification of 
identities. British officials and anthro-
pologists studied India as a pre-modern 
civilisational society. Their initial task 
was to classify groups and communi-
ties in order to rule over them. Cohn 
argues that British officials thought 
‘caste and religion were the sociological 
keys to understand the Indian people. 
If they were to be governed well then 
it was natural that information should 
be systematically collected about caste 
and religion’ (1987:243). As a result, 
Nandini Sundar argues, census ‘statis-
tics on identities became important as 
communities demanded entitlements 
on the basis of numbers, in a politics 
which conflated representation (stand-
ing on behalf of ) with representative-
ness (coming from a particular com-
munity)’ (2000:113). 
Dirks (1997:121) argues colonialism was 
sustained not only by superior arms, 
military organisation, political power 
and wealth, but also through ‘printing 
and the standardisation of languages, 
self-regulating and autonomous legal 
systems, official histories of the state 
and people and the celebration of 
national shrines, symbols and pilgrim 
centres’ that were part of the British 
colonial elite’s larger political project 
of imposing the nation state. Colonial 
conquest enabled ways to construct 
what colonialism was all about: its own 
self-knowledge (2001:13).
Documenting community social behav-
iour, customs and mores became a 
major project for the British, who used 
not only enumeration but age-old scrip-
tural and indological methods to natu-
ralise indigenous complexities. Ind-
ologists built an extensive repertoire 
of knowledge on Vedic and post-Vedic 
scriptures and translated ancient Indian 
texts from Sanskrit into European lan-
guages. British officials relied on ‘native 
informants’, generally Brahmins, to 
codify practices and classify castes. The 
Brahmins had already elaborated the 
varna four-fold classification theory, 
but manipulated it to capitalise on new 
opportunities presented by the British.
The census also created spatial-cultural 
differences, which implied two assump-
tions: group distinction based on the 
West’s spatial-cultural structures and 
the creation of spatial-cultural zones; 
and the boundedness of these groups 
defined by numbers and now called 
castes and tribes, which were placed in 
a structured hierarchy and identified 
by a cultural attribute of ‘spirituality’ 
emanating from Hindu civilisation. 
Hinduism became organically linked 
to the caste system in the new language 
of hierarchy devised by colonial census 
officials. A religion came to define a ter-
ritory: India and Hinduism became one, 
establishing Hindus as the majority and 
all other groups as the minority.
Cohn shows that the first census, in 
1871-72, classified castes within each 
religious community. Subsequently, 
British officials tried to place jatis 
among the four varnas or in ‘catego-
ries of outcastes and aborigines’. These 
officials recognised the difficulties and, 
Cohn adds, the ‘absence of a uniform 
system of classification’, but ‘it was 
widely assumed that an all-India sys-
tem of classification of castes could be 
developed’ (1987:243). As this system 
assumed the point of view of Brahmins 
and other savarnas, it codified their priv-
ileged perspective.  
Finding religion
Madan’s position reflects this perspec-
tive and remains etched in the discourse 
of binaries. For example, he considers 
‘four out of five Indians’ Hindus, using 
numerical superiority to define the major-
ity (2004:1). Like earlier indologists, he 
consults the scriptures and Manusmriti to 
identify religious constituents. Later he 
collapses all Indians into being Hindus 
when he states that ‘many components 
of culture and aspects of social structure 
of the non-Hindu communities…have 
either been borrowed from the Hindus 
or are survivals from their pre-conversion 
Hindu past…’ (2004:1).
Madan was profoundly influenced by 
Louis Dumont, who reconstructed 
binaries in an elaborate theory of hier-
archy in the East and contrasted it with 
the theme of equality in the West. While 
sociologists like Srinivas (2002) used the 
empirical method to debunk received 
assumptions and distinguished between 
varna and jati, Dumont criticised this 
empirical position, insisting not only 
that ‘a sociology of India lies at a point 
of confluence of sociology and indology’ 
(1957:7), but that ‘[t]he very existence and 
influence of the traditional higher San-
skrit civilisation demonstrates without 
question the unity of India’ (1957:10). 
Madan echoes this: ‘South Asia’s major 
religious traditions…are totalising in 
character, claiming all of a follower’s life 
so that religion is constitutive of society’ 
(2004:399). Thus he argues that ‘the 
religious domain is not distinguished 
from the secular, but rather the secu-
lar is regarded as being encompassed’ 
(2004:2).
What is this holistic notion that uni-
fies all religious activity in India? For 
Madan, it’s Dharma, which to him con-
notes the sustenance of moral virtue. 
This self-sustaining cosmo-moral order 
runs through all India’s religions, espe-
cially Buddhism, Jainism and Sikhism, 
which incorporate subtly nuanced 
Hindu principles. Thus he asserts a 
long tradition of Hinduism that was 
never a source of conflict, because its 
‘scope of inter-religious understanding 
is…immense and it is in no way con-
tradicted by the holism of the religious 
traditions of mankind’ (2004:385). Hin-
duism’s internal differences are part of 
this long history.
In India’s Religions, Madan character-
ises Hinduism as inherently plural 
and uses ‘pluralism’, as defined in the 
American tradition, to assess Hindu-
ism. In America, religious pluralism is 
loosely defined as being peaceful rela-
tions between religions and the nego-
tiated accommodation of differences. 
This process of conflict and dialogue, it 
is hoped, leads to a common good and 
implies it is not given as an a priori; the 
common good’s scope and content is 
found only through negotiation (a pos-
terior) and does not, according to plu-
ralists, coincide with any one entity’s 
position.
Madan’s position, then, only makes 
sense if it interrogates the binaries 
and abandons theories of power that 
construct the majority and minority as 
instruments of objectification. How can 
common good be negotiated between 
groups who are objects of the politics 
of knowledge construction? And those 
who have formed their self-identities 
as a majority? Whose identities have 
been defined by the colonial state and 
savarnas who benefit from these defini-
tions? When self-identities accept the 
hierarchy?
Madan and many of his contempo-
raries who uphold ‘traditions’ don’t 
seem to recognise that ‘traditions’ are 
a construct of modernity. In their logic, 
South Asia is a world steeped in ‘native’ 
resources that mitigate religious con-
flicts. By being critical of secularism, 
Madan questions modernity and how 
secularism interfaces with politics to 
create religious conflicts. As he states, 
‘…it is the marginalisation of religious 
faith, which is what secularisation is, 
that permits the perversion of religion’ 
(1991:396).
But is secularism the source of religious 
conflict? Or is the source the processes 
by which religion and religious affilia-
tion have become part of the politics of 
identity construction? Surely, we possess 
the sociological language to assess these 
processes and explain how knowledge 
construction helped build the identi-
ties articulated through them. Andre 
Betille (1994) appraises Madan’s use of 
the concept of secularisation as related 
to secularism and indicates the need to 
dissociate these two terms. On Madan’s 
use of scriptures to develop a position on 
India’s religions, Betille reminds us that 
theology alone is not enough to assess 
religion in sociological terms. 
Madan’s ideas on India’s religions 
exemplify how colonial binaries were 
imposed on the language of the soci-
ologist, who naturalised not only the 
concepts of majority and minority but 
also various theories that homogenised 
them. Knowledge alone cannot play a 
role in hegemonisation; social move-
ments and intellectuals must mobilise 
the populace through ideas. This was 
how the Hindu majority was created. 
Sanghathanas, seva  
and gurus
Hinduism as an ideology formed during 
colonialism. Its contemporary aggres-
sion, and legitimation, can be traced 
back a hundred years, when it emerged 
as the voice of the majority. Today it is 
being reconceived, but its core princi-
ples remain the same as those conceived 
in the late 19th century.
Historian Romila Thapar (1996:3-4) has 
argued that Hinduism was ‘a juxtapo-
sition of flexible religious sects’ before 
colonialism attempted to homogenise 
them. Hinduism does not affirm a sin-
gle God, prophet, founder, church, holy 
book, religious symbol or centre; faith is 
difficult to apply to its inherent diversity 
of beliefs, deities, schools of thought, 
practices, rituals and organic cultural 
links. Hinduism has no fewer than six 
schools of philosophy, an idea of God 
that ranges from monism to dualism 
to polytheism, and rituals from the 
individual Dhyana to the social ‘yagna’. 
Denominations like Vaishnavism, 
Shaivism, Shaktism and Smartism try 
to organise Hinduism around a specific 
deity or philosophy.
This diversity was reorganised in the 
colonial period. Religious groups called 
sanghathanas (literally, ‘organisations’ 
or ‘associations’) formed around gurus, 
who framed a group’s objective within 
the national narrative. Sanghathanas 
aimed to mobilise a new majority of 
believers in Hinduism against the colo-
nial state and its religion, Christian-
ity. Mobilisation entailed proselytising 
through a set of practices, called seva, 
combined with allegiance to a guru.
Sanghathanas, seva and gurus all had 
a pre-colonial existence, when they 
formed around sects and temple towns, 
but their late 19th century form was rad-
ically different, attempting to reflect and 
replicate the structure and culture of 
organisations established by the coloni-
al state in the western tradition (Copley 
2000, 2003). Thus sanghathanas emu-
lated the Christian tradition of building 
a congregation around a church – some 
were even named missions, such as one 
of the first, the Ramakrishna Mission 
– but they were instead built around 
gurus, who were considered the authen-
tic interpreters of Hindu religion. At 
first, sanghathanas were revivalist, 
seeking to either defend one particular 
Hindu tradition or denounce parts of 
it in order to posit a less recondite but 
socially oriented religion. Eventually 
they were organised around seva, which 
included guru discourses (pravachanas), 
prayers (satsangs) and work as sevaks 
(volunteers), for instance, teaching in 
schools and helping in disaster relief. 
Some sanghathanas also established 
medical help centres, hospitals, colleges 
and universities.
The guru has been defined as a spir-
itual teacher, ‘one who brings light out 
of darkness’ (Copley 2000:5). Colo-
nial period gurus whose sanghathanas 
endured were distinctive. Most were 
English-educated, from savarna upper 
castes and experienced teachers. Their 
writings were mainly in English and 
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oriented toward the emerging upper 
and middle classes. Copley argues 
that dominance rather than friendship 
and equality defined the relationship 
between the guru and his disciples, as 
gurus encouraged obedience and loyalty 
and were considered elitist and authori-
tarian (2000:6).
While the tradition of seva is as old as 
Hinduism itself, its traditional notions 
of performing service to oneself, family 
and god in the fours stages of life incor-
porated new, socio-political dimensions 
during the colonial period. Earlier texts 
defined seva in terms of life’s personal 
aspects and gave it religious overtones. 
It belonged to the private sphere, within 
the figurative walls of karmic isolation. In 
the late 19th century, seva was redefined 
as the individual sevak’s pride in a new 
religio-political identity born of an imag-
ined Hindu nation defined by gurus. At 
the time, Hinduism was threatened by 
Christian missionaries converting lower 
castes, and the colonial state’s new west-
ern ideas. Hinduism confronted them 
by developing a new public identity 
through mobilisation of the populace 
as a Hindu nation. The ideas of seva, 
the guru and the sanghathana incorpo-
rated non savarna groups into a majority 
Hindu community.
The Swami and Hindu 
chauvinism
Swami Vivekananda standardised Hindu 
principles by excavating ‘traditions’ and 
explicating a savarna reading of Hindu-
ism. In the late 19th century, his ideas 
became the fountainhead of majoritar-
ian Hinduism. Driven by his quest to 
understand the reasons for India’s colo-
nial subjugation, Vivekananda declared 
the concept of seva as ‘organised service 
to humankind’ (Beckerlegge 2000:60). 
Unlike his own guru Ramakrishna, who 
attempted to synthesise and universal-
ise Hinduism’s many popular traditions 
(Sarkar 1997), Vivekananda was unique 
in that his project remained simultane-
ously social – to reform Hinduism – and 
political – to displace colonial suppres-
sion – by mobilising new groups into an 
institutionalised structure of Hinduism. 
To create this constituency, he recon-
structed Hinduism’s defining princi-
ples by blending two distinct traditions: 
orthodox Hinduism, incorporated in the 
earliest Hindu religious texts called the 
Vedas and the religion’s contemporary 
socially sensitive and reformist aspects, 
with its principles of charity and service 
as embodied in Christianity.
Vivekananda did not stray from vedan-
tic metaphysics. Of the four yogas, he 
emphasised Karma, which he redefined 
as ‘traditional caste-based rituals and 
obligations with humanitarian service. 
The jnana of Vedantic monism was 
sought to be transformed…into a mes-
sage of strength and strenuous help to 
others’ (Sarkar 1997:347). This fusion 
influenced a generation of religious 
and political thinkers and continues 
within Hindu sanghathanas. He applied 
traditional Hindu concepts of seva, 
selfless service, and sadhana, ‘spiritual 
penance’, and insisted on the material 
poverty of sevaks.
Vivekananda’s dominant principles 
were humanitarianism and physical 
morality. In the Ramakrishna Mission, 
seva represented humane and ethi-
cal religiosity that would forge a new 
Hindu community united around the 
principle of selfless social duty. The 
community’s strength would be its spir-
itual and physical fitness; its objective 
was to help the downtrodden by improv-
ing their material condition and social 
position, and by spreading the social 
awareness and spiritual enlightenment 
that encouraged the wealthy to aid the 
less fortunate.
Most scholars see Vivekananda’s ideas as 
radical and revolutionary, arguing that by 
focusing on the masses – the deprived, 
under-privileged, weak, exploited and 
diseased – Vivekananda modernised a 
very old religion steeped in fatalist tradi-
tions and empowered Hindu society to 
be confident, self-sufficient, strong and 
fair. Some interpret his focus on individ-
ual human joy, suffering, achievement 
and failure as Hinduism made ‘human-
centric’, and his dislike of contemporary 
Hindu revivalism as reformist. Others 
consider his ideas universal, given his 
stance that Hinduism is what the world 
needs to solve its social, economic and 
spiritual crises. 
Indeed, his sensitivity to the ‘masses’, 
inclusion of ‘untouchables’ in mission 
activities and criticism of mindless 
ritualism in sanatana dharma (ortho-
dox Hinduism) makes Vivekananda 
a radical, democratic social thinker in 
some eyes. But he advocated that his 
sevak disciples train themselves to be 
pure, noble and discerning souls who 
rise above superstitions and appreciate 
Hinduism’s true character. He empha-
sised physical strength and endurance 
to withstand any challenge, as a nation 
comprised of weak people would be con-
trolled by outsiders, both spiritually and 
physically. Through seva and sadhana, 
sevaks were to overcome the ignorance 
that impoverished and subjugated Hin-
dus (Sarkar 1997), and to appreciate the 
Vedas in order to understand Hindu 
principles, what Hinduism represents 
and cleanse it of its ritualism.
In reality, Vivekananda is interested in 
the salvation of the sevaks, not of the 
masses. His ideas are not radical. He 
merely reiterates the early meaning 
of seva as practices performed by the 
individual. I agree with Sarkar (1997): 
Vivekananda not only distilled Hin-
duism’s diverse traditions, but also 
diluted his personal appeal to society’s 
underprivileged. By asserting Hindu-
ism’s vedantic orientation mainly to a 
literate English-educated upper caste 
audience, Vivekananda distinguished 
upper castes from the rest of Hindu 
society in new and subtle ways and yet 
preached for their reform. Today, com-
munal organisations, such as the Rash-
triya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), trace 
their ideologies to Vivekananda’s notion 
of seva and his dream of making Hin-
duism a world religion (Beckerlegge 
2003, 2004; Copley 2000, 2003; Sarkar 
1997). As Sarkar states, ‘More relevant 
today, ominously so, is the image of the 
Swami as one of the founders of 20th 
century “Hindutva”, of a unified and 
chauvinistic Hinduism’ (1997:291).
Like colonial officials, Vivekananda used 
indological sources to reconstruct a cod-
ified Hindu set of principles, operated 
within the caste hierarchy and present-
ed a Brahminical upper caste male view 
of Hinduism. Thus his sanghathana, 
organised through principles of hierar-
chy, made the guru Hinduism’s main 
interpreter and demanded the congre-
gation’s complete loyalty. His mission 
became a model for other gurus. 
But there is a caveat. Given Indian public 
life’s richness and diversity, and the con-
tinuous reorganisation of traditions in 
diverse forms, it’s incorrect to argue that 
Hinduism constructed one uniform nar-
rative and model. Seva, sanghathanas and 
gurus simply became the means through 
which Hindu communities mobilised, 
which is not a process of Hindu revival-
ism or reform but rather an upper caste 
intervention to create a Hindu nation 
based on religion. It was a political 
process reflecting many of the assump-
tions colonial modernity had articulated 
regarding ‘Hindu traditions’. 
An alternate language
The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh 
(RSS), mentioned above, formed in 
1925 as ‘an organisation of the self-
motivated’ and its parivar (family). 
RSS founder Dr Keshav Hedgewar, 
like Vivekananda, believed in the seva 
of education, discipline, organisation 
and instilling pride in Hinduism to 
create a band of (celibate) male sevaks 
who undertake humanitarian service. 
After Hedgewar’s death in 1940, new 
RSS leader Madhav Sadashiv Gowalkar 
integrated his predecessor’s notion. At 
the time, the RSS had 500 shakhas and 
a structure whose leader had absolute 
decision-making power. Gowalkar’s 
message ‘to worship God through serv-
ing society’ became the motto that still 
unites the RSS and its parivar. He creat-
ed many small sanghathanas for special 
seva activities; by 1997, RSS operated 
2,866 such units in India and the world 
(Beckerlegge 2004:116). These units 
have exacerbated religious and com-
munal conflicts because for the RSS 
seva activities are meant to help Hindus 
alone. Schools, medical centres and 
hospitals are established under various 
sanghathanas but serve only Hindus. 
This divides the populace according to 
religious identities. The RSS argues it 
is forced to do this because state edu-
cation and health programmes mainly 
benefit minorities. Generations of 
Hindus have grown up to believe this 
falsehood; sanghathanas even mobilise 
vigilantes to prevent minorities from 
using state resources. The RSS justifies 
these actions by its belief that India is a 
Hindu, not a secular, state.
The discourse of colonial modernity and 
the creation of the Hindu majoritarian 
movement are organically linked. Both 
elided the different cultural practices of 
jatis and ethnic groups and subsumed 
them under an upper caste perspective 
of Hinduism. Brahminical and savar-
na male interests were consolidated 
and their authority legitimised. Thus, 
majoritarianism fuels aggressive inte-
gration of Hindu identity, reclassifies 
group distinctions into religious major-
ity and minorities, and legitimises daily 
caste- and gender-related violence based 
on its justification of overt and covert 
religious discrimination. Hindus are 
encouraged to interact with each other 
and avoid minorities. Hindu authorities 
deprive minorities of services and mobi-
lise Hindu citizens to do the same. This 
attitude leads to violence where employ-
ment, services and infrastructure are 
limited. Majoritarianism subtly divides 
communities, who are then mobilised 
during communal clashes to burn, loot 
and kill each other.
Sanghathanas not only legitimised colo-
nial modernity’s project, they codified 
and systematised Hinduism in terms of 
a savarna reading of tradition and pro-
vided a model of maintaining savarna 
and patriarchal domination that the 
RSS still follows. Sociologists must rec-
ognise how colonial modernity’s insti-
tutions, processes and structures were 
renewed after independence and are 
reflected in the way majority-minority 
binaries continue to be reconstituted.
Religiosity, ethnicity and communalism 
define everyday South Asian life. Reli-
gion provides ideological legitimacy for 
extreme social and economic exclusion. 
While communal violence is an overt 
manifestation, covert communalism is 
bred by converting everyday practices 
into majoritarian projects through inte-
gration with the language of caste. Social 
science language must not become part 
of this language. To study the religious 
fault lines governing today’s South Asia, 
sociological discourse on religion must 
understand the discourse that created 
the majority-minority binary. Libera-
tion from the language of domination 
inherited from colonial modernity, and 
the creation of an alternate language, 
are required to accomplish this daunt-
ing but necessary task. <
Bibliography
- Beckerlegge, G. 2000. ‘Swami Akhandan-
anda’s sevavrata (vow of service) and the 
earliest expressions of service to human-
ity in the Ramakrishna Math and Mission’. 
Copley, A., ed. Gurus and Their Followers. 
Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- ----. 2003. ‘Saffron and Seva: The Rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh’s Appropriation of 
Swami Vivekananda’. Copley, A., ed. Hin-
duism in Public and Private. Reform, Hindut-
va, Gender and Sampradaya. Delhi: Oxford 
University Press.
- ----. 2004. ‘The Rashtriya Swayamsevak 
Sangh’s “Tradition of Selfless Service”’. 
Zavos, J., A. Wyatt and V. Hewitt, eds. The 
Politics of Cultural Mobilisation in India. 
Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Betille, A. 1994. ‘Secularism in Place’. Eco-
nomic and Political Weekly 29-10.  
- Cohn, B.S. 1987. ‘The Census, Social Struc-
ture and Objectification‘. An Anthropologist 
Among the Historians and Other Essays. 
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 224-254.
- Copley, A. 2000. ‘A Study in Religious Lead-
ership and Cultism’. Copley, A., ed. Gurus 
and Their Followers. New Religious Reform 
Movements in Colonial India. Delhi: Oxford 
University Press.
- ----. 2003. ‘Introduction’. Copley, A., ed. 
Hinduism in Public and Private. Reform 
Hindutva, Gender and Sampraday. Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1-27.
-  Dirks, N. 1997. ‘The Invention of Caste: Civil 
Society in Colonial India’. Seneviratne, H.L., 
ed. Identity, Consciousness and the Past. Forg-
ing of Caste and Community in India and Sri 
Lanka. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- ----. 2001. Castes of Mind: Colonialism and 
the Making of Modern India. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.
- Dumont, L. 1957. ‘For a Sociology of India’. 
Contribution to Indian Sociology 1.
- Madan, T.N. 1991. ‘Introduction’. Madan, 
T.N., ed. Religion in India. Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1-22.
- ----. 1991. ‘Secularism in Place’. Madan, 
T.N., ed. Religion in India. Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 394-412.
- ----. 2004. ‘India’s Religions: Plurality and 
Pluralism’. Madan, T.N., ed. India’s Reli-
gions. Perspectives from Sociology and His-
tory. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1-36.
- Patel. S. 2006. ‘Beyond Binaries. A Case for 
Self Reflexive Sociologies’. Current Sociol-
ogy 54-3.
- Sarkar, S. 1997. ‘Kaliyuga, Chakri and Bhak-
ti’. Sarkar, S., ed. Writing Social History. 
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 282-357.
- Srinivas, M.N. 2002. Collected Essays. 
Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Sundar, N. 2000. ‘Caste as a Census Cat-
egory: Implications for Sociology’. Current 
Sociology 48-3.
- Thapar, R. 1996. ‘The Theory of Aryan Race 
and India: History and Politics’. Social Sci-
entist 24-272.
Sujata Patel is Professor in the Department 
of Sociology at the University of Pune, India. 
Presently, she is researching on two themes: 
Colonial Modernity and Making of Sociologi-
cal Traditions in India and Cosmopolitanism 
and Identities in Bombay/Mumbai Her pub-
lications include The Making of Industrial 
Relations, (Oxford, 1987). She is co-editor 
of Bombay. Metaphor for Modern India, 
(Oxford, 1995), Bombay Mosaic of Modern 
Culture, (Oxford, 1995), Thinking Social Sci-
ence in India (Sage, 2002), Bombay and 
Mumbai The City in Transition (Oxford, 
2003), Urban Studies (Oxford, 2006)
spatel@unipune.ernet.in
Beyond binaries: sociological discourse on religion  in South Asia
The above essay is an abridged version of 
the author’s keynote address at the 19th 
European Conference on Modern South 
Asian Studies. The conference, held in 
Leiden, 27-30 June 2006, was organised 
by IIAS and the European Association of 
South Asian Studies. 
